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Abstract
In a model of sequential patent races, it is examined whether or not introducing
a patent law in the home country is beneﬁcial to the ﬁrms and the society as a whole
given the foreign country already offers patent protection. Before the ﬁrst patent race
starts, the ﬁrms and the foreign country share interests. For a given total number of
ﬁrms, the welfare effect depends on the relative competition proﬁt. For medium val-
ues of the latter, the foreign country as well as the ﬁrms gain and the home country
loses by introducing the patent law. In a Cournot and a Bertand model with a homo-
geneous product, the home country will never beneﬁt from the introduction of patent
protection.
JEL–Classiﬁcation: O34, L52
Keywords: Sequential patent races, patent law, competition policy
1 Introduction
In September 2003, the ﬁrst reading of the ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the patentability of computer–implemented inventions’
took place (European Commission, 2002). The Directive aims at harmonising the mem-
bers’ law and at legalising the praxis of granting software(–related) patents. The prepa-
rations of the ﬁrst reading was accompanied by partly heated discussions in nearly all
groups of society. The Economic and Social Committee as well as the Committees on
‘Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport’ as well as on ‘Industry, External Trade,
Research and Energy’ worked out detailed comments which were presented at the read-
ing.1 Representatives of the software and computer–related industries as well as CEO’s
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version of the paper.
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of individual ﬁrms argued for or against the Directive which, in general, would legalise
(even pure) software patents.
Representatives of the Open Source community put forth that software patents are
likely to bar innovation activity and endanger free and Open Source software.2 In addi-
tion, their existencewouldbe at stage and small start–up ﬁrms had no chance at all to enter
the market if the Directive were to be introduced. On the other hand, the representatives
of the software and computer industry claimed that excluding (pure) software from patent
protection violates the TRIPs agreement (World Trade Organization, 1994, Article 27).
Moreover, especially European software ﬁrms would suffer a competitive disadvantage
vis ` a vis their U.S. rivals from the non–existence of software patents.
The arguments of the representatives of the software and computer industry seem
plausible at the ﬁrst glance. Yet, how do the mechanisms work? There are several ways
in which the decision on the patentability of software may affect ﬁrms. Among them are
the ‘bargaining–chip’ argument and the traditional one about earning possibilities. The
former expresses the idea that holding patents may strengthen a party’s position in e.g.
cross–licensing agreements.3 In which particular country the patent is obtained should
be insigniﬁcant. As a signatory state of the TRIPs agreement, the U.S. grants patents
to domestic as well as foreign ﬁrms.4 Hence, European ﬁrms have the opportunity to
patent their discoveries already so that it is hard to see why European ﬁrms should suffer
a disadvantage from not being able to gather bargaining chips.
The present paper deals with the earning possibility argument. It is examined under
which circumstances ﬁrms as well as the society as a whole beneﬁt from the introduction
of patents for computer–implemented inventions, given patent protection is offered in a
foreign country. Computer–implemented inventions are characterised by two peculiari-
ties: they are often sequential and cumulative.5 To incorporate the former characteristic,
a model of sequential patent races is employed. Discoveries are uncertain; and each dis-
covery improves the preceding one by a ﬁxed amount. In case, a patent is not available,
the latest discovery can be imitated immediately and costlessly. Therefore, if the home
country does not introduce the patent law, every ﬁrm may offer the latest product on the
2 In an empirical study, Bessen and Hunt (2003) examine the effects of the legal changes in the U.S.
patent system on R&D incentives. They ﬁnd evidence for the hypothesis that software patents reduce
ﬁrms’ R&D.
3 See Shapiro (2000); Hall and Ham Ziedonis (2001) for the ‘bargaining–chip’ argument.
4 According to the Article 3 (1) of the TRIPs agreement: ”Each Member shall accord to the nationals of
other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the
protection”.
Bessen and Hunt (2003) ﬁnd that roughly 30 percent of software patents issued in the U.S. are obtained
by non–U.S. ﬁrms or residents.
5 Here, innovationsareregardedtobesequentialwhentheyfollowuponeachotherintime. Althoughthey
may or may not infringe upon each other, the product is covered by one patent. In contrast, innovations
shall be called cumulative when more than one discovery is contained in a product.Competitive disadvantage through non–existing software patents 3
domestic market and earn a competition proﬁt. Throughout the main part of the analysis,
it is assumed that the competition proﬁt and the total number of ﬁrms are not interrelated.
Here, the principal mechanisms are revealed. In a second part, the results are evaluated
for the using the standard Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly framework.
For a given number of ﬁrms it is demonstrated that they support the introduction of
a patent law if the difference between the monopoly and the competition proﬁt is high
before the ﬁrst patent race started. After the ﬁrst race is over, the winner and the losers
of the last patent race have different proﬁt prospects depending on the home country’s
decision on patent protection. Then, the winner and the losers of the last patent race
disagree on the desirability of patent rights if the difference between the monopoly and
the competition proﬁt is moderate for a given number of ﬁrms.
Before and after the ﬁrst patent race started, the home countries welfare shows pattern
similar to the desirability of patents for ﬁrms. However, since the home country has
to take the effects on the consumers’ surplus into account, it does not necessarily offer
protection of discoveries if the competition proﬁt is zero due to ﬁerce product market
competition. For the introduction of a patent law to be welfare enhancing, two conditions
have to be satisﬁed: (1) The expected monopoly proﬁt of a domestic ﬁrm has to be higher
than the total competition proﬁts accrued by all ﬁrms with certainty if the patent law is not
introduced. Put differently, the ﬁrms’ surplus has to increase due to the introduction of
the law. (2) The resulting increase in the ﬁrms’ surplus has to be higher than the decrease
in the consumers’ surplus due to the monopolisation of the product market.
Section 2 introduces the basic framework. The main results concerning the ﬁrms’
‘disadvantage’ are derived in 3. The home and the foreign countries’ welfare are analysed
in section 4. Section 5 speciﬁes the derived results for a Cournot and a Bertrand oligopoly
producing a homogeneous good; and section 6 concludes.
2 The model
There are two countries A,B. Country A (the foreign country) offers patent protection
to domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Country B (the home country) has to decide whether to
introduce a patent for computer–implemented inventions. I examine country B’s decision
problem for sequential patent races in a simpliﬁed variant of Hunt’s (1999) model.
Consider a market, e.g. the one for computer chips. All ﬁrms engage in a sequence of
global patent races. The kth patent race ends when a ﬁrm makes a discovery. The latter
can be thought of as an improvement of the computer chip. The extent of the improvement
is assumed to be ﬁxed and every discovery is patentable. If the inventor does not or cannot
patent the discovery, it immediately becomes common knowledge. Then, the discovery
is imitated by all competitors at zero costs. Since research is a cost–intensive activity it
is reasonable for the winner to apply for a patent in all countries offering this protection.4 Pia Weiss
If a patent is granted the inventor obtains the exclusive right to produce and market the
invention. For simplicity, the statutory patent life is assumed to be inﬁnite. However, the
economic patent life ends when the next discovery is achieved. In addition, it is postulated
that the patents do not infringe on each another.
In each country, there are ni, i = A,B, ﬁrms. A country i–based ﬁrm is exclu-
sively owned by individuals living in i. Let n denote the total number of ﬁrms, so that
n = nA+nB. The innovation process is stochastic in the sense that the time upon which
the discovery occurs is uncertain. In particular, it is assumed that the discoveries arrive ac-
cording to a Poisson process with parameter l. This parameter is exogenously given and
common to all ﬁrms. Therefore, ﬁrms cannot inﬂuence the individual probability to make
a discovery. The instantaneous probability for an individual ﬁrm to discover the next chip
generation is given by le−lt. In contrast, the instantaneous probability that a competitor
succeeds in inventing ﬁrst is given by (n−1)le−lt. A Poisson process is memoryless in
that the probability of discovering the next leading technology is independent of the past
innovation success. Hence, the knowledge generated during the innovation process is a
public good and has the same productivity in all ﬁrms.
Engaging in research is associated with ﬁxed costs K per unit of time, whereas patent
protection is assumed to be costlessly available. The winner of a patent race obtains
a monopoly position in all countries offering patent protection. The ﬂow proﬁt for the
monopoly is pm
i , i = A,B, in the respective markets. If the home country decides against
a patent law all ﬁrms offer the innovator’s product at the domestic market. In this case,
each loser of the race obtains a ﬂow proﬁt of pc
B ≥ 0. If the ﬁrms’ strategic variable is the
price ﬂow proﬁts are driven to zero and pc
B = 0. However, proﬁts may be positive if ﬁrms
compete in quantities. In addition, it is assumed that pm
i ≥ pc
B. Otherwise no ﬁrm would
engage in a patent race. For the time being, it is postulated that the competition proﬁt
is independent of the total number of ﬁrms so that it varies freely in the interval [0,pm
B].
Clearly, by specifying the product market competition, a precise relationship between the
competition proﬁt and the total number of ﬁrms is derived. Two examples are studied in
section 5.
2.1 No patent protection in country B
If the home country does not introduce the patent law, no ﬁrm is granted a patent
in the domestic market. Since an unprotected discovery immediately becomes common
knowledge, all ﬁrms are able to offer the inventor’s product at market B. However, the
foreign country grants exclusive rights to all ﬁrms so that domestic as well as foreign
ﬁrms may obtain a monopoly position in A.
Let VI and VC denote the value of having discovered the k−1st innovation (being an
incumbent in the kth race) and the value of having not discovered the latest innovation
(being a challenger in the kth race). Assuming that the values are stationary, i.e. theyCompetitive disadvantage through non–existing software patents 5













The subscript n indicates that country B offers no patent protection. According to the ﬁrst
equation, the return on the money equivalent of the value to enter the next patent race as
a challenger equals the sum of the instantaneous net proﬁt pc
B−K and the expected gain
from winning the next patent race VI
n −VC
n which occurs with probability l. The incum-
bent of the next race receives the monopoly proﬁt in market A. Since he is unprotected
in country B, he earns the competition proﬁt pc
B in the domestic market. Therefore, the
net ﬂow proﬁt is given by pm
A +pc
B−K. The second equation describes that the return on
the money equivalent of the value of being the incumbent in the next race equals the sum
of the instantaneous proﬁts and the expected loss from losing the incumbency during the
next race. The latter event takes place with probability (n−1)l.
































As long as the home country does not have a patent law, every ﬁrm offers the latest
technology at market B. Thus, the incumbent as well as every challenger receives a net
ﬂow proﬁt of pc
B−K in this market with certainty. This accounts for the fact that the ﬁrst
terms of the continuation values VC
n and VI
n are identical. They are the present value of
the net proﬁt earned in market B.
The remaining terms in equation (1) are related to the proﬁts obtained in market A.
On average, every ﬁrm spends a fraction l/(r+nl) of time as incumbent in future. As
a monopoly, the incumbent earns a ﬂow proﬁt pm
A. (n−1)l/(r+nl) is the average time
spent as a challenger. However, as market A is monopolised by the incumbent, the chal-
lengers obtain zero proﬁts in this market. Consequently, the second terms of the con-
tinuation values are the expected present values of the proﬁts earned in A during future
races. The last term of the continuation value VI
n signiﬁes that the difference between an
incumbent and a challenger is the position in the next patent race. While the incumbent
receives the monopoly proﬁt the challenger earns nothing.
2.2 Patent law in country B
In case country B decides for a patent law, the inventor of the latest technology obtains
a patent and the monopoly position in country A and B. The challengers compete in the
subsequent patent race, but are unable to offer a product at either market.6 Pia Weiss











Here, the subscript p stands for ‘patent protection’ in country B. The interpretation of the
equations parallels the one of the previous section. The difference consists in the altered
ﬂow proﬁts. Since both markets are monopolised, a challenger has a negative net ﬂow
proﬁt −K, whereas the winner of the patent race obtains pm
A +pm
B −K. Solving the system

































The ﬁrst term is the present value of the research costs which all ﬁrms have to bear.
The second term of the equations in (2) is the expected present value of the total proﬁts
earned as an incumbent in future races. The future earning possibilities are identical to
an incumbent and a challenger so that the second terms are the same in both equations.
Again, the last term of VI
p is the incumbent’ present value of proﬁts received in the next
race.
3 The ﬁrms’ ‘disadvantage’
The present section deals with the question of whether country B–based ﬁrms suffer a
disadvantage from the non–existence of a patent protection in their home country. In order
to derive the desired results, the situation in which the home country introduces the patent
law is compared to the situation in which it does not. Since the analysis is symmetric on
the ﬁrm level, identical arguments apply to country A–based ﬁrms.
In general, a country B–ﬁrm favours patent protection if the continuation value under
protection exceeds the one for a situation without a patent law in the home country. For-
mally, the difference Vp−Vn has to be positive, where Vp−Vn measures the desirability
of patent protection in the home country. Whether or not a ﬁrm prefers a patent law may
depend on its position in the next patent race. Let z be deﬁned as z = pc
B/pm
B. Then, z
is the competition proﬁt relative to the monopoly one and takes values in the interval of
[0,1]. The next result speciﬁes the conditions for protection to be desirable.6
Proposition 1. Let zC(n) ≡ l/(r+nl) and zI(n) ≡ (r+l)/(r+nl). Then,
VC
p −VC
n ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ z ≤ zC, (3)
VI
p −VI
n ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ z ≤ zI. (4)










Figure 1: Different evaluation of the patent law
According to (3) and (4), zC(n) (zI(n)) gives the relative competition proﬁt for which
a challenger (an incumbent) is indifferent between a situation with and without a patent
law in the home country for a total number of ﬁrms n. Then, the proposition states that for
a given n an incumbent as well as a challenger favours the patent law if the relative com-
petition proﬁt is comparably small. In particular, the difference between the monopoly
proﬁt and the competition proﬁt needs to be sufﬁciently large.
The functions zC(n) and zI(n) are drawn in ﬁgure 1. They are negatively sloped in the
n/z–diagram. Consequently, for the ﬁrms to remain indifferent between the home coun-
try’s choices, a larger number of ﬁrms has to correspond to a smaller relative competition
proﬁt z. To see why this result applies, note that every ﬁrm receives the competition proﬁt
pc
B with certainty when the home country does not introduce the patent law. If a patent law
exists in B, only an incumbent is able to accrue a positive proﬁt pm
B, since the challengers
are not able to sell products in a monopolised market. Due to the stochastic nature of the
innovation process, the event of becoming an incumbent is uncertain and the probability
is the lower the more ﬁrms are participating in a patent race. Hence, for a ﬁrm to stay
indifferent between the home country’s choices, the reward from being an incumbent in
the next patent race has to increase, i.e. z has to decline, when the number ﬁrms increases.
Both functions approach the horizontal axis as the total number of ﬁrms grows large.
This property demonstrates that an incumbent as well as a challenger prefers patent pro-
tection when product market competition drives proﬁts to zero. It can also be seen in
ﬁgure 1 that neither ﬁrm would support a patent law if the difference between the compe-8 Pia Weiss
tition and the monopoly proﬁt were negligible.
In addition, ﬁgure 1 shows that the graph zC(n) lies below the one of zI(n). The
intuition is straightforward. All ﬁrms receive ﬂow proﬁts pc
B with certainty if discoveries
are unprotected in the home country. In contrast, if the country introduces the patent
law the payoff prospects are different for an incumbent and a challenger. Although all
ﬁrms are equally likely to gain incumbency in future, the latter occupies the monopoly
position and earns the larger proﬁt in the next patent race. Given the total number of
ﬁrms, the challenger’s reward from becoming an incumbent has to be higher (z has to be
lower) compared to the incumbent’s reward if the ﬁrms are to be indifferent between the
country’s choices.
From the properties of the functions zC(n) and zI(n), the following result can be de-
rived:
Corollary 1. (1) A challenger and an incumbent are better off without a patent protec-
tion in region I of ﬁgure 1.
(2) The incumbent prefers the introduction of a patent law, but the challenger does not
in region II of ﬁgure 1.
(3) A challenger and an incumbent favour a patent protection in region III of ﬁgure 1.
To see why all ﬁrms gain from the non–existence of patent protection in region I,
it is instructive to consider the special case of z = 1. Under patent protection, only the
incumbent earns a positive proﬁt pc
B = pm
B. Since winning the patent race is an uncertain
event, the expected proﬁt to an incumbent is lower than pm
B = pc
B. However, the latter is
the proﬁt that all ﬁrms receive with certainty if there is no patent law. Therefore, patent
protection cannot be desirable to an incumbent or a challenger under those circumstances.
In region III, a patent law is beneﬁcial to all ﬁrms. Consider the case of z=0. Without
a patent protection all ﬁrms earn the competition proﬁt pc
B = 0. If the domestic market is
monopolised, the challengers receive zero proﬁts as well. In contrast, the winner of the
last patent race obtains the monopoly proﬁt. As long as the monopoly proﬁt is strictly
positive, the expected return from incumbency is strictly positive as well and, hence,
exceeds the competition payoff. Since all ﬁrms have a positive probability of winning a
patent race in future, all ﬁrms support the introduction of a patent law.
An interesting situation arises for (n,z)–combinations belonging to region II. Here,
the incumbent and the challengers disagree about the desirability of patent protection.
For a given relative competition proﬁt, the total number of ﬁrms is too high so that the
probability of winning a patent race in future is relatively low. Consequently, the expected
proﬁt from gaining incumbency in future is lower than the certain competition proﬁt; and
the challengers prefer discoveries to remain unprotected. However, the winner of the last
patent race obtains the monopoly proﬁt during the next race if the patent law is introduced.Competitive disadvantage through non–existing software patents 9
The difference between the monopoly and the competition proﬁt is just sufﬁcient to make
a patent law desirable for the next race’s incumbent.
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 apply to situations in which the ﬁrst patent race has
already taken place. Before the sequence of patent races starts, a ﬁrm does not know
whether it will be an incumbent or a challenger in the ﬁrst race. Hence, ex–ante, a ﬁrm’s
value to participate in the ﬁrst patent race differs from VI andVC. LetV denote the value
of entering the ﬁrst race. Then,V can be determined byV = lVI+(n−1)lVC. Using the














This immediately leads to the next result.
Proposition 2. Let zF(n) ≡ 1/n. Then,
(5) Vp−Vn ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ z ≤ zF(n).
Even before the ﬁrst patent race starts, a ﬁrm supports the introduction of a patent
law if the relative competition proﬁt is not too large and, hence, the difference between
the monopoly and the competition proﬁt relatively high. Conversely, if the difference
between the monopoly and the competition proﬁt is small a ﬁrm prefers discoveries to
remain unprotected. Again, the function zF(n) marks the combinations (n,z) for which a
ﬁrm is ex–ante indifferent between the existence and non–existence of patent protection
in the home country. Since the value of participating in the ﬁrst patent race is the linear
combination of the value of being an incumbent and a challenger respectively, the graph
of zF(n) lies in region II of ﬁgure 1. Accordingly, in the limiting situations, ﬁrms behave
alike independent of whether or not the ﬁrst race started. In particular, this means that a
ﬁrm ex–ante supports patent protection when the competition proﬁt approaches zero and
votes against a patent law if the difference between the monopoly and competition proﬁt
becomes small before the ﬁrst race starts.
Following Proposition 1 and 2, it can be argued that domestic ﬁrms suffer from the
non–existence of patent protection when the competition proﬁt is low compared to the
monopoly one for a given number of ﬁrms. In addition, after the ﬁrst patent race has
taken place, the incumbent and the challengers may disagree about the desirability of a
patent law according to Corollary 1. However, it has to be pointed out that domestic ﬁrms
do not experience a competitive disadvantage vis ` a vis their foreign rivals since the model
is symmetric at the ﬁrm level, i.e. the foreign ﬁrm suffers as well.10 Pia Weiss
4 Welfare analysis
Even if all ﬁrms agree on the desirability of a patent protection a society as a whole
may well arrive at a different conclusion because it will take the consumers’ surplus into
account. The present section studies how the introduction of a patent law affects country
B’s and A’s welfare.
Assume that the consumers’ surplus can be described by a function S(n). Then, n = 1
marks a situation where the corresponding market is monopolised and the consumers’
surplus is S(1). When n > 1, the product market is (im)perfectly competitive and the
consumers’ surplus is S(n). Without a threat of entry, the monopoly charges a higher price
and offers a lower quantity than ﬁrms in a competitive environment so that S(n0) > S(n00)
for all n0 > n00 ≥ 1.
As an i–based ﬁrm is exclusively owned by inhabitants of i, the proﬁt of the ﬁrm is
payed as dividends to the individuals in i. Therefore, the total welfare is the sum of the
consumers’ surplus and the proﬁts of the ni ﬁrms. As the ﬁrms’ expected proﬁt may differ
after the ﬁrst patent race has taken place, we have to distinguish the countries’ welfare
before and after the ﬁrst patent race starts.
4.1 Country B’s welfare
Consider the kth patent race. Independent of whether or not the home country has
a patent law, the country’s welfare depends on the origin of the next race’s incumbent.
Therefore, country B’s welfare has to be derived for the cases in which a domestic and a
foreign ﬁrm have made the latest invention.
Assume that country B does not protect discoveries. Then, all n ﬁrms will imitate and
sell the latest discovery at the domestic market. Let W denote country B’s welfare. The
social value WI
n and WC


















If a country B–based ﬁrm is the incumbent, the instantaneous welfare of the home coun-
try consists of the consumers’ surplus S(n), the incumbents’ monopoly proﬁt received in
country A and the total net proﬁts nB(pc
B −K) earned by ﬁrms at the domestic market.
According to the ﬁrst equation, the return on the money equivalent of the social value
WI
n equals the sum of the instantaneous welfare and the expected welfare loss arising
when a foreign ﬁrm is winning the next patent race. The latter event occurs with prob-
ability nAl/n = (n−nB)l/n. If all nB ﬁrms are challengers they earn zero proﬁts in the
monopolised market A. Then, the instantaneous welfare of country B is the sum of the
consumers’ surplus S(n) and the net proﬁts obtained by the nB ﬁrms in the domestic mar-
ket nB(pc
B−K). The second equation requires the return on the money equivalent WC
n toCompetitive disadvantage through non–existing software patents 11
be identical to the sum of the instantaneous welfare and the expected welfare gain derived
if one of the nB ﬁrms wins the next patent race. This event takes place with probability




























Now, suppose that country B offers patent protection. Under these circumstances,
both markets are monopolised by the ﬁrm that won the last patent race. Accordingly,
all challengers earn zero ﬂow proﬁts in both markets. Then, country B’s social value


















is the incumbent in the next patent race, the instantaneous welfare of B is the sum of the
consumers’ surplus and the net monopoly proﬁts accrued in both markets pm
A +pm
B −K.
In contrast, if a foreign ﬁrm wins the current patent race the nB ﬁrms have a negative
net proﬁt of K during the next race. Then, the instantaneous welfare of B is S(1)−nBK.
The difference between the above equations and the ones applying to the non–protection
regime is the instantaneous welfare for B. Therefore, the interpretation of those equations




























A government aiming at maximal welfare will introduce a patent law if and only if
doing so results in a welfare gain, i.e. if Wp−Wn > 0. Given the equations in (6) and (7)
we ﬁnd:


















The proposition shows under which conditions a policymaker is willing to introduce
a patent law depending on whether or not a domestic ﬁrm wins the current patent race. In
general, the government weighs social costs and social beneﬁts.12 Pia Weiss
Condition (8) describes country B’s problem if a domestic ﬁrm is the incumbent in the
next race. According to this condition, patent protection leads to a welfare gain if the po-
tential social beneﬁts – the right–hand side (rhs) of the second inequality – outweighs the
social costs – the left–hand side (lhs) of the second inequality. The social costs stem from
monopolising a competitively organised market. Here, the consumers suffer a welfare
loss of S(1)−S(n) < 0. On the other hand, there are potential gains from the introduction
of a patent law associated with monopoly proﬁts exceeding the competition proﬁt in the
domestic market. If country B introduces the patent law, the average fraction of time in
which a domestic ﬁrm occupies incumbency in future is (lnB/n)/(r+l). Since a domes-
tic ﬁrm will hold the monopoly position in the next race, the total expected ﬁrms’ surplus
is pm
B(r+lnB/n)/(r+l) under patent protection. Without patent protection, the ﬁrms’
surplus is nBpc
B with certainty. Therefore, the rhs of the second inequality is the expected
social gain derived from the introduction of the patent law. The interpretation of condition
(9) follows analogous steps.
Note that, although pm
B ≥ pc
B, the ﬁrms’ surplus from the introduction of patent pro-
tection need not to be positive turning the potential social beneﬁts into additional social











The bracket term becomes negative as the total number of ﬁrms grows large. Clearly, a
society would never consider to offer patent protection under those circumstances.
A comparison between conditions (8) and (9) reveals that country B’s potential social
beneﬁts due to the introduction of a patent law are always larger if the incumbent is a
domestic ﬁrm. In particular, this implies that if the ﬁrms’ surplus decreases when the
incumbent is a foreign ﬁrm, the ﬁrms’ surplus either decreases by a smaller amount or
even increases if the incumbent is a domestic ﬁrm. Consequently, there are parameter
constellations for which country B’s decision to introduce a patent protection depends
on whether or not a domestic ﬁrm is the incumbent. This is comparable to region II of
ﬁgure 1, where an incumbent and a challenger disagree on the desirability of a patent law.
Dissimilar to the ﬁrms’ point of view, a society would not necessarily introduce a patent
law if the competition proﬁt were zero. The divergence of evaluation stems from the fact
that a society takes the consumers’ beneﬁts S(n)−S(1) from a non–monopolised market
into account which are strictly positive.
Before the ﬁrst patent race takes place, a country does not know whether a domestic
or foreign ﬁrm wins the ﬁrst race. The ex–ante expected social welfare can be determined














for country B’s choices.
Proposition 4. Let zS(n)≡1/n−[S(n)−S(1)]/[nBpm
B]. Before the ﬁrst patent race starts,






B ⇐⇒ z ≤ zS(n).
Again, condition (10) shows that the government of B is only willing to offer patent
protection if the potential social beneﬁts – the rhs of the ﬁrst inequality – are larger than
the social costs due to monopolising the domestic market. Similar to conditions (9) and
(8), the society may decide against a patent law before the ﬁrst race starts even though the
competition proﬁt is zero. This can also be seen in the second inequality by noting that
zS(n) may become zero for a ﬁnite total number of ﬁrms. Condition (10) differs from the
ones in (9) and (8) since the ex–ante potential social beneﬁt is the weighted average of the
ones when the incumbent’s origin is known.
According to conditions (5) and (10), the ﬁrms’ and the society’s ex–ante evaluation
of the patent protection may differ.
Corollary 2. Figure 2 veriﬁes that the following statements are valid before the ﬁrst
patent race starts.
(1) The government never introduces the patent law if the ﬁrms prefer the non-existence
of protection(region I).
(2) When the government introduces a patent law, no ﬁrm ﬁnds the non-existence prof-
itable (region III).
(3) There are situations in which the ﬁrms prefer a patent protection, however, the
government does not offer it (region II).
4.2 Country A’s welfare
CountryA’swelfareisalsoaffectedbythehomecountry’sdecisionontheintroduction
of a patent law. However, the effects on the foreign countries’ welfare differs since the
product market in A is always monopolised due to the existence of an own patent law.
Consequently, the foreign consumers’ surplus is independent of country B’s choice. Then,
the sole source of the foreign country’s change in welfare stems from a change in the











Figure 2: Different ex–ante evaluation of the patent law
Taking analogous steps as the ones in the previous section, country A’s ex–ante social
























Proposition 5. Country A gains from a patent protection in the home country, i.e. ¯ Wp−
¯ Wn ≥ 0, if and only if
z ≤ zF(n).
The proposition states that the foreign country’s ex–ante evaluation of a patent law is
identical to the ﬁrms’ ex–ante point of view. This result is in line with intuition. As the
foreign country already offers protection for discoveries, the foreign consumers’ surplus
does not change if the domestic ﬁrm introduces a patent law. Therefore, the ﬁrms’ and
the foreign country’s interest are the same. In particular, this implies that the foreign and
the domestic country interests diverge in region II of ﬁgure 2.
5 Example: Cournot and Bertrand competition
In the previous sections, it has implicitly been assumed that the competition proﬁt
is independent of the total number of ﬁrms. This may be a reasonable assumptions forCompetitive disadvantage through non–existing software patents 15
some forms of product market competition, e.g. the Bertand model of a homogeneous
product. However, for other forms of product market competition, this assumption is too
strong. Therefore, the present section re–examines the derived results for the example of
a Cournot and a Bertrand oligopoly producing a homogenous good. Likewise, the above
results can be evaluated once a particular model of the product market has been speciﬁed.
Firstly, consider the case of Cournot competition. Suppose that the discoveries im-
prove the quality of a given product as in the case of chip generations. Let Qk denote
country B’s total industry output in the kth patent race so that Qk = å
n
i=1qik.7 The inverse
demand function for the kth race is given by
(12) pk(Qk) = ak−Qk.
The reservation price ak may differ between patent races if consumers are willing to pay
more for high quality goods, i.e. the next chip generation. Since an unprotected discovery
is instantly imitated, all ﬁrms share the same production technology which is assumed
to exhibit constant returns to scale. Then, the cost function for the kth patent race can
be written as Cik(ck,qik) = ckqik. It is postulated that the unit cost may depend on the
product’s quality.
Let Sk, Sk = ak −ck, denote the market size if the equilibrium price equals the unit
costs for the kth patent race. Since the ﬁrms are identical in the home country under














The relative competition proﬁt was deﬁned as z = pc
B/pm
B. Using the proﬁt functions
from (13) ensues in
(14) ˜ z(n) =
4
(n+1)2.
For every possible total number of ﬁrms n, n ∈ [1,¥), the function determines the relative
competition proﬁt z compatible with the Cournot model of a homogeneous product. If
there is only one ﬁrm the competition proﬁt equals the monopoly one so that the relative
competition proﬁt is one as well. As the number of ﬁrms approaches inﬁnity, the relative
competition proﬁt shrinks to zero. The function ˜ z(n) is negatively sloped and convex
in a n/z–diagram. Note also that the function ˜ z(n) is the same for all patent races and
independent of the market size.
Comparing the functions zF(n) and ˜ z(n) shows that the difference is given by
zF(n)− ˜ z(n) = (n−1)2/[n(n+1)2] > 0. Therefore, the function zF(n) illustrating the
(n,z)–combinations for which a ﬁrm is ex–ante indifferent between country B’s choices
lies above the one of ˜ z(n). Consequently, before the ﬁrst patent race starts, a ﬁrm always
















Figure 3: The Cournot and Bertrand case
prefers country B to introduce the patent law in the Cournot oligopoly with a homoge-
neous product.




Since the total number of ﬁrms has to exceed the number of ﬁrms in country B, the dif-
ference is always positive. Hence, before the ﬁrst patent race starts, the government of
the home country will never introduce the patent law if there is a Cournot oligopoly pro-
ducing a homogeneous good. However, the country A’s welfare would rise if the home
country were to introduce the patent law since the foreign country takes the ﬁrms’ point
of view. The situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 3 (a).
With prices as the strategic variable in a homogeneous product market, the compe-
tition proﬁt pc
B is zero independent of the total number of ﬁrms. Therefore, the (n,z)
combinations compatible with the Bertrand model are given by ˆ z(n) = 0. In the Bertrand
case, the function zS(n) simpliﬁes to zS(n) = 1/n−3/(2nB). The function zS intersects
the horizontal axis at nB2/3 < nB. Consequently, for a given number of domestic ﬁrms
nB, the home country will never increase it welfare by introducing a patent law. On the
other hand, the ﬁrms as well as the foreign country would beneﬁt from patent protection.
The situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 3 (b).
In the Cournot and the Bertrand model of a homogeneous product, the home country
does not ﬁnd it worthwhile to introduce the patent law. However, other product market
models may arrive at different conclusions.Competitive disadvantage through non–existing software patents 17
6 Conclusion
In a simple decision model has been used to show under which circumstances ﬁrms
and the society suffers from the non–existence of patent protection when the races are
sequential and a foreign country has a patent law. Due to the stochastic nature of the
innovation process, the ﬁrms’ and the countries’ evaluation of a patent law differs before
and after the ﬁrst race has taken place.
For a situation in which the ﬁrst race has taken place, the following results have been
derived: For a given total number of ﬁrms, all ﬁrms decline a patent protection when
the relative competition proﬁt is high. Likewise, the ﬁrms agree in the desirability of a
patent law if the relative competition proﬁt is low. For intermediate values of the latter,
the winner and the losers of the last race arrive at different conclusions. While the dif-
ference between the monopoly and the competition proﬁt is inadequate to compensate a
challenger, it is sufﬁcient for the incumbent as he occupies the monopoly position during
the next race. For the home country, qualitatively similar results are derived. However,
the introduction of a protection for discoveries negatively affects the consumers’ surplus.
Consequently, thereareconstellationsin whichﬁrmsandthehomecountrydisagreeabout
the beneﬁts of a patent law.
Before the ﬁrst patent race has taken place, similar results are obtained. Given the
total number of ﬁrms, ﬁrms and countries are not interested in a patent law if the relative
competition proﬁt is high. If the latter is low ﬁrms always vote for the law. In contrast,
the home country may or may not gain by protecting discoveries depending on the precise
total number of ﬁrms. Since the foreign country has a patent law, the consumers’ surplus
remains unchanged when the home country introduces patent protection. Therefore, the
foreign country shares the ﬁrms’ point of view so that the same results apply to country
A.
Before and after the ﬁrst patent race started, whether or not countries and ﬁrms beneﬁt
from patent protection rests on the exact combination of the total number of ﬁrms and
the relative competition proﬁt. It has been demonstrated that the home country on the
one hand and the ﬁrms and the foreign country on the other hand may arrive at different
conclusions. For the example of a Cournot and a Bertrand oligopoly producing a homo-
geneous good, it has been shown that the ﬁrms and the foreign country always desire the
protection whereas the home country does not increase its welfare by doing so.
The disparity in the evaluation of the welfare effects between the countries can be seen
in the positive externality generated by unilaterally offering patent protection to all ﬁrms
in the foreign country. Thereby, the consumers’ surplus shrinks in the foreign country due
to the monopolisation of the market. However, in case a domestic ﬁrm is the incumbent,
the higher monopoly proﬁt is accrued by the domestic country. Yet, the latter enjoys a
higher consumers’ surplus as the domestic market is not monopolised.18 Pia Weiss
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let bl ≡ l/(r+nl) and bu ≡ (r+l)/(r+nl). According to (1)
and (2),VC
p −VC
















n ≥ 0 if and only if z ≤ bu = zI(n).
Proof of Corollary 1. Let zC(n) and zI(n) be deﬁned as above and Z ≡ R+ ×[0,1]. Let
Iu ≡ {(n,z) ∈ Z|z ≥ zI(n)} and Il ≡ Z\Iu be the upper and lower contour set of zI(n).
Let the upper and lower contour setCu andCl corresponding to zC(n) be deﬁned likewise.
From the deﬁnition of zC(n) and zI(n) follows zC(n) < zI(n) which implies Iu ⊂Cu.





n ≤ 0 according to Proposition 1.
Region III of ﬁgure 1 is the lower contour setCl. From zC(n) < zI(n) and Proposition
1 follows that VI
p −VI
n ≥ 0 and VC
p −VC
n ≥ 0.
Region II of ﬁgure 1 is the intersection set Cu∩Il = {R+×[0,1]}\Iu =Cu\Iu. The
latter is non–empty since zC(n) < zI(n). Then, VI
p −VI
n ≥ 0 and VC
p −VC
n ≤ 0.




B[1/n−z]/r. Consequently,Vp−Vn ≥0 if and only if z≤1/n=zF(n).
Proof of Proposition 3. Let DS(n) ≡ S(n) − S(1), du ≡ (r + nBl/n)/(r + l) and dl ≡




B − DS(n)]/r. Then,
WI
p −WI
n ≥ 0 if and only if DS(n) ≤ dupm
B −nBpc
B.




B −DS(n)]/r. Hence, WC
p −
WC
n ≥ 0 if and only if DS(n) ≤ dl −nBpc
B.
Proof of Proposition 4. UsingthedeﬁnitionofWp andWn,Wp−Wn =l[pm
BnB/n−nBpc
B−
(S(n)−S(1))]/r. Then, Wp−Wn ≥ 0 if and only if S(n)−S(1) ≤ pm
BnB/n−nBpc
B which
proves the ﬁrst inequality. The difference can be rewritten to Wp −Wn = nBlpm
B[1/n−
z − {S(n) − S(1)}/(nBpm
B)]/r. Then, Wp −Wn ≥ 0 if and only if z ≤ 1/n − {S(n) −
S(1)}/(nBpm
B) = zS(n) which proves the second inequality.
Proof of Corollary 2. Let zF(n), zS(n) and Z be deﬁned as above. Let Fu ≡ {(n,z) ∈
Z|z ≥ zF(n)} and Fl ≡ Z\Fu be the upper and lower contour set of zF(n). Let Su and
Sl be deﬁned likewise. From the deﬁnitions of zF(n) and zS(n) follows zF(n)−zS(n) > 0
which implies Fu ⊂ Su.
RegionIistheuppercontoursetFu. SincezF(n)>zS(n),Vp−Vn ≤0andWp−Wn ≤0
by Proposition 2 and 4.
RegionIIIisthelowercontoursetSl. FromFu ⊂Su followsSl ⊂Fl sothatVp−Vn ≥0
andWp−Wn ≥ 0 due to Proposition 2 and 4.
Finally, region II is the intersection Fl ∩Su. According to Proposition 2 and 4 Vp −
Vn ≥ 0 andWp−Wn ≤ 0.Competitive disadvantage through non–existing software patents 19
Proof of Proposition 5. From(11), ¯ Wp− ¯ Wn =(n−nB)lpm
B[1/n−z]/r. Hence, ¯ Wp− ¯ Wn ≥
0 if and only if z ≤ 1/n = zF(n).
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